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Abstract
This article provides an empirical assessment of the growth experiences of Eu-
ropean regions, during the period 1991￿ 2004, by taking into account the spatial
e⁄ects due to both institutions and geography. These e⁄ects have been modelled
by means of speci￿c controls and by using a non-conventional spatial weight ma-
trix. Results favour a model dealing with substantive spatial externalities. Within
this framework, the country-speci￿c institutions are strongly and positively re-
lated to the regional productivity￿ s growth rate. In addition, the geo-institutional
proximity increases the spatial dependence of the regional output per worker and
raises the speed of convergence. By contrast, the pure geographical metrics is
underperforming, while underestimating the convergence dynamics.
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11 Introduction
Assessing economic growth and income convergence across European regions is an im-
portant and debated issue, especially after the recent enlargements which progressively
increased the EU from 15 to 27 Member States. Particular concerns are expressed about
the widening of the economic and social disparities between the new Adhesion Coun-
tries and the former EU-15 States, since the bulk of the European Commission￿ s budget
is devoted to the reduction of inequalities.1 Consequently, some important questions
arise, both from a political and an economical point of view. Will the poor regions grow
faster and eventually catch up with the rich ones? What are the deep determinants of
the economic growth at a regional scale? Do spatial location in￿ uence the patterns of
development? Could regions which share similar institutional and geographical factors
converge quickly?
Starting from the pioneering work by Quah (1996), it has been largely recognized
that space matters for growth in Europe. In fact, the distribution of income tends to be
conditioned by its physical location, since agglomeration dynamics in￿ uence the spatial
interaction of regional units by means of, for instance, human capital spillover and
technology di⁄usion (Ciccone, 2002). The main channels through which space a⁄ects
the regional economic activity can be explained in terms of ￿ relative￿and ￿ absolute￿
location.2 The ￿rst concept refers to the e⁄ects originated by the relative location of
one region with respect to the others. By contrast, the second one relates to the impact
on a region from the fact of being located in a particular point in space, independently
from its neighboring regions.
Omitting these relevant aspects from the empirical models of regional growth and
convergence is doomed to produce several misspeci￿cation problems, as we will describe
in the next section. Under this respect, the growing application of spatial econometrics
techniques generated a big improvement for the ￿eld of growth empirics, over the last
ten years (an incomplete list of works includes Fingleton, 1999; L￿pez-Bazo et al., 1999;
Arbia and Paelink, 2003; Le Gallo and Ertur, 2003; Badinger et al., 2004; Gardiner et
al., 2004; Funke and Niebuhr, 2005; Ertur et al., 2006; Le Gallo and Dall￿ erba, 2006;
Battisti and Di Vaio, 2008; Fingleton, 2008; Ramajo et al., 2008).
Such methods deal with either the absolute or the relative location e⁄ect, by impos-
ing on the model a prede￿ned spatial weight matrix, which incorporates the topology of
the system and establishes the spatial linkages among the regions. This kind of matrix
is usually based on a purely geographical metrics (like e.g. physical distance), according
to criteria given by contiguity measures (rook, queen, and bishop), ￿ k-nearest￿regions,
or more complex decay functions. The main advantage of using physical distance-
based weights is that they can be unambiguously considered exogenous to the model,
avoiding in this way estimation problems due to identi￿cation, causal reversion and
1Regions are the main administrative units charged with the spending of the Structural Funds.
2These concepts are commonly used in geographical analysis. Recently, they have been discussed
in a regional framework by Abreu et al. (2005) and may be also related to the notions of spatial
dependence and spatial heterogeneity, introduced by Anselin (1988).
2non-linearity.3 However, they su⁄er from a major drawback, in that they fail to cap-
ture distances that are not geographically-based and yet can play an important role in
shaping the economic behavior both at a micro and a macro level.
Looking at the relative location e⁄ect, the economic relationships may be a⁄ected by
a multidimensional space that also includes social and institutional factors. It is widely
known that social distance (e.g. heterogeneity) in￿ uences the agents￿behavior by means
of neighborhood e⁄ects, since social interactions provide incentives for individuals to
behave similarly to others (Akerlof, 1997; Brock and Durlauf, 2006).4 According to
this, social networks may foster the knowledge di⁄usion, increasing the strength of
the spatial externalities. Interestingly, BŁnabou (1996) highlights that heterogeneities
in education and wealth lead to strati￿cation dynamics, which in turn gives rise to
persistent income inequalities. Glaeser et al. (1996) show that the variance of crime
across space can be explained by social interactions, while Topa (2001) points out that
local interactions in the labour market cause the unemployment rates to be spatially
correlated, due to the exchange of information within the social network. In addition,
considering the production structure of the economy, the multinational ￿rms facing
legal and bureaucratic costs might prefer to invest in homogeneous countries, in order
to reduce the administrative burdens due to cross-border operations (Kox et al., 2004).
As for the absolute location e⁄ect, common institutional, cultural and geographical
factors vary across countries while impacting on regional growth, at the same time.5
On one side, an important strand of research has shown the relevance of institutions,
in the form of property rights￿protection or market regulation, for the explanation
of cross-country di⁄erences in income levels (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al.,
2001; Rodrick et al., 2004).6 E¢ cient institutions provide the set of incentives which is
conducive to economic growth, a⁄ecting the transaction costs of the economy (North,
1990). Contrary, bad institutional quality, as well as a risky environments, reduces the
convenience to invest.
On the other side, geography plays a crucial role in stimulating the economic devel-
opment. Physical geography, like location and climate, is highly di⁄erentiated across
countries, exerting a decisive in￿ uence on the economic behavior (Olsson and Hibbs,
2005). Geographical factors indirectly condition the distribution of the level as well as
the growth rate of income, impacting on transport costs, disease burdens, and agricul-
tural productivity (Gallup et al., 1999). Furthermore, the growth rate of population
in countries of lower absolute latitude is usually high, due to their tendency to pro-
3Physical distance is also a good proxy of transport costs.
4Akerlof (1997) de￿nes a gravity function in which part of the distance is inherited (e.g. physical
distance), and part is acquired (e.g. institutional distance).
5These e⁄ects have been usually controlled for by means of country-speci￿c dummies (Armstrong,
1995; Neven and Gouyette, 1995). The shortcomings of using these variables are connected to the fact
that they do not allow to identify the nature of the country-speci￿c e⁄ect (e.g. it may be produced by
institutions, geography or other characteristics). However, we inserted the country-speci￿c dummies
in the standard speci￿cation and the results obtained were very similar.
6In a recent work, Tabellini (2008) ￿nds that formal institutions, as well as cultural traits, are the
main determinants of the European regional economic performance.
3duce large families, which depresses the rate of growth of per capita output (Strulik,
2008). Consequently, higher level of development are generally reached in the temperate
regions, either between or within countries (Bloom and Sachs, 1998).
The aim of this paper is therefore to assess the European regional growth and
convergence process, by taking into account both the relative and the absolute location
e⁄ect due to institutions and geography. To our best knowledge, the two aspects have
not been considered jointly in the previous literature. To pursue this aim, we extend the
basic growth equation of Barro (1991) in order to incorporate the spatial externalities by
means of a non-conventional spatial weight matrix built on geo-institutional distances.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic
growth model and some alternative speci￿cations that account for externalities and
spatial e⁄ects. It also deals with the de￿nition of the geo-institutional spatial weight
matrix. Section 3 presents the data used in the empirical part of the paper together with
some descriptive statistics. It particularly focuses on the non-trivial attempt to measure
empirically the absolute and relative location e⁄ect on the process of European regional
growth. Section 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis, their interpretation
and some tentative conclusions. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the major ￿ndings and
suggests possible future developments.
2 The empirical model
2.1 The growth equation
The empirical analysis that will be presented in Section 4 is based on a growth regression
of Barro (1991), augmented in order to deal with the spatial e⁄ects of the absolute and
the relative location due to both institutions and geography. The ￿rst of these e⁄ects
is simply modelled introducing institutional and geographical country-speci￿c controls
among the regressors. The second is captured by a spatial term accounting for the
region-speci￿c e⁄ects stemming from the geo-institutional spatial externalities and it
is modelled through a spatial weight matrix able to discern the causal relationships
produced by those regions characterized by proximity in a multidimensional space.
Let us begin with a standard growth equation (see Durlauf et al., 2005), expressed
in matrix notation as
g = ￿ + ￿ logyt￿T + Z’ + ", (1)
where g = (logyt ￿ logyt￿T)=T is a N ￿ 1 vector of average growth rates of regional
per worker output in real terms between time t ￿ T and t, t is the ￿nal year, T is a
scalar denoting the time length, ￿ is a N ￿ 1 vector of constant terms, logyt￿T is a
N ￿ 1 vector of logs of regional per worker output at the beginning of the period, Z is
a N ￿ K matrix of explanatory variables, ￿ is the so-called convergence coe¢ cient, ’
is a K ￿ 1 vector of parameters, and " ￿ N(0;￿2I) is a N ￿ 1 vector of well-behaved
error terms.
4The parameter ￿ is of particular interest, since it can be seen as a test of the ￿ catching
up￿and it is expected to be negative, meaning that poor regions grow faster than rich
ones. In addition, the parameter approximates the speed of convergence towards the
steady state. If the set of control variables (Z) is excluded from the model, equation
(1) tests the unconditional or absolute beta-convergence hypothesis, which takes place
if all the regions in the sample share the same steady state determinants, converging in
the long-run to the same level of per worker output (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).
However, if the steady state equilibria vary across regions, their determinants should
be controlled for with a set of regressors, in order to avoid a potential bias in the con-
vergence coe¢ cient. In this case, equation (1) tests the conditional beta-convergence
hypothesis, so that regions exhibit convergence towards their speci￿c steady state. Fol-
lowing Mankiw et al. (1992, henceforth MRW), we hold the steady state variables ￿xed
by the inclusion of physical (sk) and human (sh) capital investment rates, and a term
(n + ￿ + ￿) that accounts for population growth (n), technological progress (￿), and
depreciation (￿). All these variables can be considered a direct extension of the Solow
growth model and some of them (e.g. human capital) are usually found to be robustly
related to economic growth (Doppelhofer et al., 2004).
Furthermore, the spatial externalities are explicitly accounted for in the model. The
absolute location e⁄ect, that is the e⁄ect of being located in a particular point in space,
may be captured by country-speci￿c institutional (q) as well as geographical (l) control
variables, in order to test the relative importance of institutions compared to pure
geography. In the full speci￿cation, the matrix of K explanatory variables is therefore
given by Z = [sk; sh; n + ￿ + ￿; q; l], where each element between parentheses is an
N ￿ 1 vector.
The relative location e⁄ect deserves particular attention since it is related to the
concept of spatial dependence, which leads the standard growth equation to be seriously
misspeci￿ed (Anselin and Bera, 1998; Anselin, 2001; Arbia, 2006). In fact, the residuals
from a growth regression estimated for European regions tend to be highly spatially
auto-correlated (Battisti and Di Vaio, 2008). Equation (1) can thus be augmented
assuming a spatial auto-regressive structure for the error term
" = ￿W" + ￿, (2)
where W is an N ￿N spatial weight matrix￿ de￿ned below￿ incorporating the spatial
connections of the system, ￿ is a spatial auto-regressive parameter, " is an N ￿1 vector
of spatially correlated errors, and ￿ is an N ￿ 1 vector of ￿ a-spatial￿disturbance terms
with regular properties.
If the inverse (I￿￿W)￿1 exists,7 combining Eqs. (2) with (1) gives rise to a reduced
form
g = ￿ + ￿ logyt￿T + Z’ + (I ￿ ￿W)
￿1￿, (3)
where I is the N ￿ 1 identity matrix. Equation (3) expresses the growth process as a
spatial error model (SEM), which has two main features. The ￿rst one presents spatial
7For a row-standardized spatial weight matrix, this condition is satis￿ed if j￿j < 1 (Anselin, 2003).
5auto-correlation as a global process. This can be seen expanding the spatial ￿ Leontief￿
inverse (I ￿ ￿W)￿1 in a sum of in￿nite terms I + ￿W + ￿
2W2 + ::: (Waugh, 1950).
The expansion implies that region-speci￿c shocks propagate themselves to the whole
set of regions, because all the locations in the system are connected to each other. The
second feature can be expressed by treating the spatial externalities as unmodelled or
nuisance factors, since they work through the error structure by means of a mix of





e⁄ects (see Le Gallo et al., 2005,
for an application to European regions).
Recently, much emphasis has been placed to models that incorporate substantive
spatial dependence, meaning that spatial e⁄ects propagate to neighboring regions by
means of endogenous as well as exogenous variables (Fingleton and L￿pez-Bazo, 2007;
LeSage and Fischer, 2008). The rationale underlying such models is twofold. First of all,
they are strictly linked to theoretical growth models which consider spatial externalities
in the form of technology transfer or knowledge di⁄usion due to the accumulation
of factors in the surrounding area (L￿pez-Bazo et al., 2004; Egger and Pfa⁄ermayr,
2006). Secondly, it has been shown that the existence of spatial dependence among the
disturbances of a standard growth regression, in the presence of an omitted variable
correlated with an exogenous regressor, leads to a model inclusive of substantive spatial
dependence (Pace and LeSage, 2008).
After a spatial transformation, equation (3) can be written in the structural form
of a Spatial Durbin Model (SDM)
g = ￿+￿ logyt￿T + Z’ + ￿Wg+￿Wlogyt￿T + WZ# + ￿, (4)
where ￿ is a vector of constants, ￿ = ￿￿￿ and # = ￿￿’ can be seen as restrictions
on the parameters of Eq. (3), while the other terms have the same notation as before.
If the restrictions hold, the model boils down to the SEM, implying nuisance spatial
dependence in the data. On the contrary, if the restrictions are not accepted, equation
(4) supports substantive spatial dependence, which works by means of both endogenous
and exogenous spatially-lagged variables.
The restrictions can be tested by ￿rst estimating equation (4) as the unrestricted
version of equation (3), and then carrying out a likelihood ratio test of the spatial
common factors (LRCom) equal to
LRCom = ￿2(Lur ￿ Lr) ￿ ￿
2(k), (5)
where Lur and Lr are the values of the log-likelihood function of the unrestricted and the
restricted models, respectively, and k is the number of the implied restrictions (Mur and
Angulo, 2006). If the LRCom is statistically signi￿cant, the null hypothesis of spatial
common factors is rejected, so that the correct speci￿cation should be based upon the
unrestricted version given by equation (4), where ￿ 6= ￿￿￿ and # 6= ￿￿’. The choice
between the two models, i.e. SEM and SDM, is thus operated following a ￿ general to
speci￿c￿strategy (Florax et al., 2003).
6A meaningful economic interpretation of the SDM can be derived from the reduced
form of equation (4)
g = (I ￿ ￿W)
￿1 (￿+￿ logyt￿T + Z’ + ￿Wlogyt￿T + WZ# + ￿), (6)
which incorporates only exogenous terms among the right-hand side variables, and
implies a di⁄erent and more complex spatial pattern than the one derived from the
SEM structure (see Anselin, 2003). It is worth noticing that in the model described
through Eqs. (1) and (3) the partial derivative of per worker output￿ s growth rate
with respect to the initial level of per worker income is solely given by the convergence
coe¢ cient (i.e. ￿). By contrast, in the SDM such derivative is di⁄erent and is expressed
by
@g=@ logyt￿T = (I ￿ ￿W)
￿1(￿I + ￿W). (7)
In the case of a row-standardized spatial weight matrix, after the inverse expansion,
and rounding to the ￿rst order spatial terms,8 it can be showed that the convergence
speed for a generic region is given by
(1 + ￿)￿ + ￿. (8)
The catching up process is therefore in￿ uenced by the ￿ neighborhood￿ , through the
spatial externalities captured by the parameter ￿, and by the term (1 + ￿)￿. This
second term is given by a linear combination of the spatial auto-correlation parameter
multiplied by the ￿ coe¢ cient. Compared to the cases of either the standard growth
model or the SEM (equations 1 and 3, respectively), in which the convergence speed is
provided only by ￿, the convergence dynamics in the SDM speci￿cation also depends
on the signs and magnitudes of the spatial parameters. Furthermore, the SDM can be
considered a more general case with respect to the other models, in that @g=@ logyt￿T !
￿ if ￿;￿ ! 0.
2.2 The spatial weight matrix
The N ￿N spatial weight matrix W incorporates the topology of the economic system
and sets the linkages existing among the regions in the sample. It is usually speci￿ed as
a row￿ standardized distance￿ based matrix which elements are de￿ned according to a




















wij = 0 otherwise,
(9)
8The e⁄ects of higher orders rapidly approach to zero.
9The more popular contiguity matrices are not useful in the case of European regions, since they
leave the islands unconnected.
7where d
geo
ij is a measure of the geographical (e.g. physical) distance between regions i
and j, and dgeo is a critical distance cut￿ o⁄after which spatial e⁄ects are considered to
be negligible.10 The row￿ standardization helps the interpretation and the comparison
of the parameters, ensuring the condition 0 < wij ￿ 1. In this way the spatially￿ lagged
variables are equal to a weighted average of the neighboring values.
The choice of the weights constitutes a crucial issue, in that they represent the
a priori knowledge of the strength of the spatial connections (Stetzer, 1982). Simple
geographical metrics, as the ones de￿ned by Eq. (9), are often used as good proxies
for transport costs and technological transfers. Those metrics, however, fail to capture
other kind of distances that also play a major role in shaping the economic relationships
across space (Anselin, 2002).
To go beyond these limitations, socio￿ economic weighting structures have been pro-
posed in the literature. For instance, Case (1991) and Case et al. (1993) combine
population, income and geography to identify the in￿ uence exerted by regions that are
similar in demographic or economical terms. Aten (1996) uses trade ￿ ows as a mea-
sure of relative location that accounts for di⁄erences in transport costs and hence for
price di⁄erentials among geographical units. Conley and Topa (2002) employ social
and economic distances re￿ ecting the structure of agents￿social networks, as disparities
in ethnic and occupational distributions, to examine the spatial patterns of unemploy-
ment.
In order to assess the in￿ uence of relative location due to distance in institutions, we
modify the spatial weight matrix speci￿cation, so that the non￿ zero elements de￿ned





















ij ￿ dgeo ￿ dinst, (10)
where 1 ￿ dinst
ij < 1 can be seen as an institutional heterogeneity index whose values
denote increasing dissimilarity for dinst
ij ! 1, and dgeo ￿ dinst constitutes a minimum
threshold making each region connected at least to one neighbor.11
The multiplicative speci￿cation through which the institutional distance enters the
weighting function, gives a leverage e⁄ect to the geographical distance so that, holding
the latter ￿xed, the greater is the former, the lower is the neighbors impact and vice
versa.12 Since we assume that regions belonging to the same country share similar
institutions, we set dinst
ij = 1 if i;j 2 s;8i;j, where s denotes the country. This is not
10We use the Euclidean distance between the centroids of the regions, while the cut-o⁄ is given by a
minimum threshold able to guarantee that each region has at least one neighbor. The elements of the
main diagonal are set equal to zero by convention, since regions cannot be neighbor to themselves.
11With respect to Eq. (9), the speci￿cation of Eq. (10) may produce changes not only in the relative
weights of the neighboring regions, but also in the structure of the neighborhood, so that regions which
are institutionally similar become closer in space.
12Following Case (1991), in a previous version of the work we tested a di⁄erent scheme of the weight
matrix, nesting institutional and geographical distances in an additive manner. Results however are
very similar.
8a groundless assumption, since many social functions (like e.g. health care, education
or justice) are still provided by national institutions.13 Finally, some empirical works
support the thesis that national borders do have an impact on the regional economic
dynamics, at least in an integrated regional system like the EU (Meliciani, 2006). In our
model the geographical distance is therefore the only one that matters for the regions
located in the same state.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
The empirical part of this paper focuses on a sample of 271 NUTS-2 European re-
gions.14 The dependent variable consists in the average growth rate of per worker GDP
from 1991 to 2004, expressed at 2000 prices. The exogenous variable employed in the
absolute beta-convergence speci￿cation is given by the level of per worker GDP in 1991,
at 2000 prices. Both variables are taken from Cambridge Econometrics, European Re-
gional Database, Summer 2007.15 In addition, the conditional beta-convergence model
includes the MRW variables, namely the average physical investment rate, the pop-
ulation growth, the technological progress and the depreciation rate over the period
1991-2004. These are also taken from the Cambridge Econometrics database.16 As for
the human capital investment rate, we adopt a proxy consisting in the ratio of people
with tertiary school attainment to the economically active population (15-over), over
the period 1998-2004 which is available from Eurostat, Regional education statistics.17
In order to capture the absolute location e⁄ect due to country-speci￿c institutions,
we insert an institutional quality index among the set of the regressors. The index is
taken from the World Bank￿ s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) elaborated by
Kaufmann et al. (2006). The variable is made up of survey data aggregated into six
indicators, averaged over the years 1996-2004.18 The indicators range from ￿2:5 to 2:5
13In the present study it is also a necessary choice, due to lack of socio-institutional data at regional
level.
14The regions in the sample belong to the EU-27 countries, plus Norway and Switzerland. NUTS is
the acronym for Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics established by Eurostat. The list of
regions is available upon request.
15For the cases of Latvia and Lithuania, we use the level of GDP in 1992 as the beginning year,
since the values for 1991 seem to be highly underestimated, probably due to the conversion from the
communist system to the market system.
16As it is usual in growth empirics, we assume that technological progress and depreciation rate are
constant and equal to 0.02 and 0.05, respectively.
17The data are released according to the International Standard Classi￿cation of Education (ISCED)
1997. We use the ISCED level 5-6. Unfortunately, no data are available before 1998. However, the lack
of data does not seem to create a severe bias in the estimates since the distribution of the attainment
is substantially stable over short time periods. In fact, the Spearman￿ s rank correlation coe¢ cient
between 1998 and 2004 is equal to 0.91. Therefore, it seems quite reasonable to assume that the
distribution did not change sensibly during the period 1991￿ 1997.
18Data before 1996 are missing. As in the case of the attainment, the distribution of the institutional
variable did not vary so much over the period considered, since the simple correlation coe¢ cient
between the two years 1996 and 2004 equals 0.94. Consequently, we would not expect particular biases
9and are based on voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence,
government e⁄ectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.
To check the robustness of the results we also employed the International Country
Risk Grade (ICRG) used by Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997), which reports measures
related to the soundness of institutions and to the attractiveness of the environment for
investors. We used a simple sum, averaged over the years 1991-1997, of ￿ve indicators
out of six: quality of bureaucracy, corruption in government, rule of law, expropriation
risk, and repudiation of contracts by government.19
Figure 1 shows the WGI for the European countries. Looking at the histogram, a
wide variation in the quality of institutions can be observed. In the left side of the
graph, there are countries with high institutional quality. These are mainly the North-
ern countries (like Finland, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Norway) and countries
belonging to the former EU-15 (apart from Switzerland and United Kingdom). In the
middle part, we ￿nd some Latin or Cohesion countries (France, Spain and Portugal)
while in the right side of the graph are concentrated all the Eastern and New Adhe-
sion countries and, in addition, Greece and Italy. These latter have a poor quality of
institutions although they belong to the former EU-15. The countries with the worse
institutional quality are Bulgaria and Romania, which receives a negative score.
[FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE]
Some criticism has been cast on the quality and the nature of the institutional data.
For instance, corruption indicators may di⁄er from the aspects of corruption they want
to represent due to lack of clarity in the de￿nition and of conceptual precision (Knack,
2006). Indicators of institutional quality might also be conceptually unsuitable to the
assessment of the causal relationship between institutions and growth, because they
depend more on the endowments of human and social capital than on variables which
re￿ ect ￿ deep￿parameters a⁄ecting the development of the economy (Glaeser et al.,
2004). The consensus about such kind of indicators, however, remains high (for a reply
to the critics, see Kaufmann et al., 2007). In fact, WGI and ICRG have proved to be
highly signi￿cant among the determinants of the income level in several cross-country
studies (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004).
An important methodological aspects refers to the potential endogeneity of the in-
stitutional variables, because they might be in￿ uenced by the level of development.
Starting from the work of Lipset (1960), several authors have argued that growth in
income and human capital impacts on the institutional quality, rather than the other
way around. To check if the results of our estimates would be sensitive to causal re-
version (i.e. simultaneity), we used an instrumental variable (IV) estimation of the
parameters in equation (1). The categorical nature of the institutional controls (i.e.
in the estimates.
19No data are available after 1997.
10country-speci￿c discrete variable), however, would lead to unreliable results of the clas-
sical IV estimator. As a further robustness check, we use data from the POLITY
database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005), which includes average scores of democracy
and autocracy, and the duration of political regimes. More speci￿cally, we utilize the
POLITY2 index, measuring the di⁄erence between democracy (ranging from 0 to 10)
and autocracy (ranging from 0 to 10), over the period from 1946-1980, so that a score
of 10 equals a perfect democratic regime (i.e. no constraints on executives), while ￿10
equals perfect autocracy. The logic under this strategy relies on the assumption that
past institutions might a⁄ect the current growth rate of per capita income while, on
the contrary, the present growth rate cannot determine past institutions. Anyway, we
wouldn￿ t expect a large bias due to causal reversion, since institutions usually change
in the long-run, while the present study covers a time span of about 15 years.20
As a proxy for the absolute location e⁄ect due to geography, we use the latitude of
country￿ s centroid taken from the Geography Datasets, developed by J. L. Gallup, A.
D. Mellinger, and J. D. Sachs, for the Center for International Development at Harvard
University.21 This is a country-speci￿c variable, whose impact can be directly compared
to the one deriving from the institutions. Absolute latitude is commonly used in growth
empirics in order to capture the role played by the geographical location. Bloom et al.
(2003), for instance, ￿nd that latitude is a fundamental exogenous force that in￿ uences
the economic outcome. In fact, some kinds of technologies, like those adopted in the
agricultural or in the building sector, do not transfer across ecological zones. In addi-
tion, Northern hemisphere midlatitudes have, in general, larger populations and larger
markets for innovation, thus attracting a higher number of ￿rms in order to exploit
lower transport costs (Bloom and Sachs, 1998).
Figure 2 reports the scatterplot of productivity in 2004 versus absolute latitude for
the European countries. No clear-cut relationship can be inferred from the graph, since
poorest countries fall in both high and low relative latitudes. This is mainly due to the
fact that poor countries, like the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) or the
North-Eastern countries (like Poland) are located in high latitudes while, at the same
time, there are less developed countries falling in low latitude areas, like the South-
Eastern countries (Bulgaria and Romania) or the Cohesion countries (Greece, Portugal
and Spain). In some cases, however, the level of development seems to be positively
related to the latitude, since the richest countries have highest values of relative latitude,
like the Northern countries (Denmark, Netherlands, United Kingdom and Sweden).
[FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE]
20Some doubts have been also cast on the exogeneity of the MRW variables (Bernanke and G￿rkay-
nak, 2001), like the physical and human capital saving rates. The lack of available instruments for the
European regions included in our sample prevented us from using an IV framework for those variables.
As described in the next section, we conducted an IV estimation on a smaller sample where, following
Barro and Lee (1994), we rely on past values of physical capital investment rates as instruments of the
current ones. The di⁄erences between OLS and IV estimates are more or less negligible.
21Due to lack of data, we assign to Malta the same value of Italy.
11Next, we describe the variables used as proxies for the relative location e⁄ect, in-
corporated in the spatial weight matrix. Pairwise geographical distances refer to the
physical Euclidean distance between the centroids of the regions. As for the institu-
tional distance, we considered two metrics. The ￿rst one is obtained from the OECD￿ s
Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicators (Conway et al., 2005). More speci￿cally,
Kox et al. (2004) release the country pairwise di⁄erences from the original OECD
data. For the year 1998, we calculate the inverse of similarity so as to have a more
intuitive measure of the di⁄erence. The adoption of institutional distances, however,
could induce endogeneity problems in the weight matrix. To avoid this e⁄ect, we also
use a proxy of the institutional heterogeneity index, which is given by the linguistic
distance and it is de￿ned as ethnological di⁄erences by families of languages (Disdier
and Mayer, 2007). It can be argued that languages capture speci￿c institutional char-
acteristics of the countries. However, since they are stable in the short-run, they can
be unambiguously considered exogenous to the model. This variable is often utilized
in empirical models of bilateral trade, since the greater is the linguistic distance, the
higher are the obstacles to trade. Originally the pairwise linguistic indicator is built on
proximity, with values ranging from 0 to 1, 1 denoting perfect similarity. In order to
get a proxy of linguistic distance we then rescale such a measure by taking the inverse
of the similarities.22
On average, former EU-15 countries tend to be more similar among them, while the
same is true for the New Adhesion countries. Few exceptions, however, arise in the
case of Malta and Romania, which are New Adhesion countries, but are closer to the
Western countries, in terms of language, and in the case of Finland, which is a former
EU-15 country that shares more similarities with the former Soviet Union states, like
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
4 Discussion of the results
The ￿rst step of the estimation phase refers to the standard growth equation expressed
by Eq. (1) in its several speci￿cations. Subsequently we test for the potential mis-
speci￿cations of the model, related to omitted variables or to the fact of neglecting the
spatial e⁄ects stemming from geography and institutions.
Table 1 shows the estimation results of the absolute beta-convergence model (col-
umn 1). The estimated ￿ is negative and highly signi￿cant, implying a convergence
speed equal to about 1.2%. This value is higher than the one usually obtained from
growth regression of per capita￿ instead of per worker￿ income (see Battisti and Di
Vaio, 2008), but is well below the so-called ￿ empirical norm￿of 2% (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2004). Such a result points out that the dispersion of participation rates plays a
22For the case of Hungary the measure takes high values, because the Hungarian linguistic root
is completely di⁄erent from the Indo-European languages. Both the institutional and geographical
distances are row-normalized by the mean, so to avoid a dominance e⁄ect due to the scale of the
variables.
12role in the explanation of the di⁄erent patterns of regional convergence across Europe.
However, the sensitivity of the coe¢ cient to the change of the speci￿cation adopted
seems to denote the existence of a potential bias. In fact, moving to the conditional
beta-convergence model reported in column 2 of Table 1 produces a dramatic decrease
of the convergence speed from 1.2% to 0.2%, which is not statistically di⁄erent from
zero. This particular result might be partly due to the fact that, in contrast with the
case of cross-country growth regressions, the physical investment rates of the Euro-
pean regions are inversely related to the level of per worker output.23 Therefore, the
omission of this variable, which positively impacts on the regressand (see the values of
’sk), causes a downward bias of the estimated convergence parameter. Once the bias
is removed, the ￿ undergoes an upward shift that reduces the convergence speed.
[TABLE 1 AROUND HERE]
The inclusion of the term given by n + ￿ + ￿ works in the same direction, since
this variable is positively correlated with the initial level of income while a⁄ecting in a
negative way the productivity growth rate (see ’n+￿+￿). On the contrary, an o⁄setting
bias is caused by the human capital accumulation (sh). This latter is positively related
to both the productivity growth rate and the initial level of income, creating, this
way, an upward bias (see ’sh). The net e⁄ect, however, consists of a decrease of
the convergence speed. All the estimated parameters have the sign predicted by the
MRW model, since the accumulation of physical as well as human capital increases the
economic growth, at regional level, while the population growth, plus the technological
progress and the depreciation, leads to a decrease.
Turning to the absolute location e⁄ect, this is captured by the inclusion among
the regressors of the proxy variables for institutions, geography, or both. Adding the
country-speci￿c institutional control (column 3) produces a positive and statistically
signi￿cant impact on the growth of per capita output (see ’q), raising the conver-
gence rate to 1%.24 Therefore, regions belonging to countries endowed with a better
institutional quality tend to experience higher growth rates, as well as they tend to
(conditionally) converge faster among themselves. The introduction of the country-
speci￿c geographical control (column 4), represented by the absolute latitude, also has
a positive and signi￿cant impact on the dependent variable (see ’l), indicating that
23The Pearson￿ s correlation coe¢ cient between initial per worker output and physical capital invest-
ment rates, human capital saving rates, and population growth rates, is equal to ￿0:4, 0:4, and 0:7,
respectively.
24As a proxy for institutions we utilize the WGI. The results are largely robust to the use of the
alternative measure given by the ICRG. To deal with the endogeneity issue, we conducted an IV
estimation on a restricted sample of 205 regions. POLITY2 measures, and past values of ￿xed gross
investment rates, are used as instruments of the WGI and the current investment rates, respectively.
Also in this case, results do not qualitatively change. Details are available upon request.
13regions located in Northern European countries grew comparatively faster than the
others, over the period considered.
However, the convergence coe¢ cient does not show a large variation, from column 2
to column 4, after controlling for the absolute location e⁄ect due to geography, indicat-
ing that latitude does not play a fundamental role as an omitted variable in European
regional growth models, since it is only weakly correlated with the initial level of income.
When the institutional and the geographical proxies enter the regression simultaneously
(column 5), the latter becomes not signi￿cant, while the remaining parameters assume
the same values as in column 3. This is an interesting aspect, with a two-fold impli-
cation. On one side, it con￿rms that absolute location matters. On the other side, it
stresses that institutions have a dominant role, with respect to geography, as a deter-
minant of either the growth or the convergence process of the regions of Europe. In
addition, the inclusion of the institutional control helps to explain more that 50% of
the variance in the data (see the R2-Adjusted, columns 3 and 5).
The following step in the empirical analysis consisted of the testing for spatial de-
pendence among the data as the outcome of the relative location e⁄ect. The Moran￿ s
I statistics reported in the bottom part of Table 1 show the presence of a positive
and highly signi￿cant spatial auto-correlation among residuals in all the regressions. In
addition, the spatial correlation tends to be higher when the geo-institutional spatial
weight matrix is taken into account (Moran￿ s Idgeo￿dinst).25 In such a case, equation (1)
is misspeci￿ed and OLS estimates are no longer valid. Particularly, in this case the em-
pirical growth model should be modi￿ed to accommodate a form of spatial dependence
and the parameters should be estimated by means of maximum likelihood techniques.
Consequently, estimation of the spatial growth regressions￿ SEM and SDM￿ are
carried out both in the benchmark case of a pure geographical spatial weight matrix
and in the case that considers geo-institutional distances. Firstly, the best weight matrix
speci￿cation is chosen, within the model, according to the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC).26 The values shown in Figure 3 highlight that, both for the SEM and the SDM,
the model incorporating the geo-institutional spatial distance is always preferred, while
the conditional beta-convergence equation (including the institutional control) ￿ts the
data better.
[FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE]
Secondly, the LRCom test is conducted in order to discriminate between the two
spatial models built up with purely geographical distances and with compounded ge-
ographical and institutional distances. As it can be seen from Table 2, in both the
25The result is obtained using the linguistic distance in the geo-institutional spatial weight matrix.
26Within models (e.g. SEM and SDM), the preferred speci￿cation is selected according to the AIC
because the two versions (with pure geographical or geo-institutional weights) have the same number
of the estimated parameters.
14cases of pure geographical and geo-institutional weight matrix (this latter turned out
to be the preferred choice according to the AIC) the test always rejects the restrictions
imposed on the parameters, implying that the SDM provides a more correct interpre-
tation of the spatial dependence existing in the data. Therefore, the propagation of
the spatial externalities across the European regions takes the form of a substantive
phenomenon rather than just of a nuisance e⁄ect.
[TABLE 2 AROUND HERE]
For the sake of brevity, Tables 3 and 4 display only the estimates of the selected
model (SDM) comparing the two di⁄erent options given by the pure geographical and
the geo-institutional spatial weight matrix. Table 3 lists the results of the benchmark
case in which only the geographical distance is considered. First of all, it should be noted
that the spatially-lagged parameters of the productivity￿ s growth rate (￿) and the initial
per worker income (￿) are always positive and statistically signi￿cant. The relative
location, due to proximity in the physical space, generates a spatial spillover, which
can be caused by knowledge di⁄usion or technological transfers from the neighboring
regions. This spillover works through both the growth process and the accumulation of
factors. On the contrary, some parameters of the other spatially-lagged variables are
not signi￿cant in all the speci￿cations adopted (i.e. #sk and #q).
[TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
From Table 3 it can be seen that the ￿ coe¢ cient is always negative and statistically
signi￿cant in all the regressions. A correct assessment of the convergence dynamics,
however, should be made by looking at the term consisting of (1+￿)￿+￿. As it can be
seen, the convergence speed is generally higher than the one obtained from the standard
growth regression, since it ranges from 0.5 to 1.4%. Such outcome can be explained
using two di⁄erent arguments. On one hand, it can be seen in the logic of spatially
auto-correlated omitted variables. Since per capita output is positively auto-correlated
across space, and its spatial lag has a positive impact on the productivity￿ s growth
rate, the inclusion of the spatially-lagged initial level of per capita productivity tends
to reduce the convergence coe¢ cient, with respect to the standard growth model. The
convergence speed turns out to be therefore increased. On the other hand, the result
can be motivated by a more conceptual reason. If the regional steady-state is a⁄ected
by the neighborhood￿ s accumulation of factors, when the spatially-lagged initial level of
per capita productivity is inserted in the model, we likely estimate a spatial conditional
convergence, which should be generally higher since the adjustment process takes place
among regions that share similar long-run determinants. Looking at the absolute e⁄ect
15due to institutions, it still has a positive and signi￿cant impact (columns 3 and 5),
while the one deriving from geography is negative, also when it enters the regression
separately (column 4).
Table 4 reports the estimates of the SDM with the geo-institutional spatial weight
matrix.27 It￿ s worth noticing that, on average, the convergence speed is about doubled
with respect to the SDM with pure geographical distances, and it is about four times
with respect to the standard growth regression shown in Table 1. In fact, it takes
values ranging from 1.7% to 2.4%, implying that once the institutional distance (i.e.
heterogeneity) is controlled for in the spatial weight matrix, the regional convergence
turns out to be fostered. This basically involves that holding the physical distance ￿xed,
regions which share similar (national) institutions tend to converge at an increased pace
to each other, since the convergence rate is higher than the canonical 2%. Interestingly,
the parameters of the spatially-lagged variables, given by the productivity￿ s growth
rate and the initial per worker income, generally raise their magnitude if compared to
the values reported in Table 3. Relative location e⁄ects are therefore enhanced among
regions which are close in terms of institutional setting, this latter playing a dominant
role with respect to the geographical dimension.
[TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]
As for the absolute location e⁄ect, institutions maintain their relevance, while the
impact of geography disappears in the case where it enters the model separately from
the institutional control (column 4), or becomes weakly negative in the case where
it enters jointly with it (column 5). To conclude, the SDM growth regression, in the
form of the conditional beta-convergence speci￿cation accounting for both absolute and
relative location e⁄ects due to institutions (columns 3 and 5), contributes to explain
about 60% of the variance of regional growth rates across Europe.28 This seems to be
a remarkable result in a cross-sectional framework.
5 Conclusions
In the present paper an empirical test of growth models has been conducted in order
to provide a correct assessment of the productivity￿ s convergence dynamics across the
European regions. In particular, the spatial e⁄ects of the absolute and relative loca-
tion, due to either institutions or geography, have been taken into account.29 Those
e⁄ects have been modelled by means of speci￿c controls and imposing a spatial weight
27We utilize the linguistic distance, so to avoid the endogeneity of the weight elements. The use of
the PMR indicators produces the same qualitative results, but it reduces the convergence speed. The
full tables of the estimates are available upon request.
28For the case of the spatial models, R2 means a pseudo R2.
29As far as we know, these aspects have never been treated jointly in the previous literature.
16matrix, which incorporates a multidimensional concept of distance. The kind of spatial
externalities have been identi￿ed following a general to speci￿c strategy, which led to
the selection of the most appropriate model, while the best weight matrix speci￿ca-
tion has been chosen according to an information criterion. In addition, the speed of
convergence has been derived in the case of the chosen model.
Results show that a growth model, which deals with spatial externalities as a sub-
stantive phenomenon, seems to be the best candidate in explaining the European re-
gional growth patterns. In fact, the spillover stemming from the neighboring regions,
reasonably due to technology transfer or knowledge di⁄usion, mainly works through the
accumulation of output.
The absolute location e⁄ect due to country-speci￿c institutions, captured by an in-
stitutional quality index, is strongly and positively related to the growth rate of regional
productivity. In fact, institutions play a dominant role with respect to geographical fac-
tors, like the country￿ s latitude. Thus, the result seems to con￿rm that the ￿ primacy of
institutions over geography￿ , identi￿ed worldwide by Rodrik et al. (2004), applies also
to the case of the European regions.
The relative location e⁄ect is accounted for, instead, by the inclusion of a spatial
weight matrix, which is built on a geo-institutional distance. This e⁄ect is highly
signi￿cant and increases the spatial dependence of the regional output per worker.
Pure geographical metrics, like the physical distance, largely underperforms in terms of
the ￿t of the data, and underestimates the convergence dynamics. In fact, the inclusion
in the weight matrix of the institutional heterogeneity index, given by the linguistic
distance, produces an increase of about four times of the speed of convergence, on
average, with respect to the standard growth model. This means that holding the
geographical distance ￿xed, the regions which share a similar institutional framework
tend to converge more rapidly to each other. This ￿ndings are partly in line with the
prescriptions of recent theoretical models which stress that limited forms of institutional
integration may be conducive of economic growth for the merging countries (Spolaore
and Wacziarg, 2005).
Finally, some policy implications can be indirectly deduced. In the last decade,
some criticism has been addressed to the EU structural and cohesion policies, since
they didn￿ t exert the desired impact on the reduction of the income disparities. As it is
well known, these policies have been mainly devoted to investments in infrastructures
and aid to production. Looking at the results presented in this paper, a shift of such
policies through the improvement of the quality of institutions, on the one side, and the
reduction of the institutional heterogeneity, on the other side, might induce a stronger
decrease of the inequalities across Europe. Future research should aim to use the
di⁄erent distance metrics in more advanced econometric settings such as, for instance,
the panel-type regression. At the present stage, the work highlights the extremely
di⁄erent results that can be obtained by using those metrics within the most standard
cross-sectional framework.
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23TABLE 1: Standard growth regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
￿ 0.142￿￿￿ 0.050￿￿￿ 0.113￿￿￿ 0.038￿￿￿ 0.113￿￿￿
￿ ￿ 0.012￿￿￿ ￿ 0.002 ￿ 0.010￿￿￿ ￿ 0.003￿￿ ￿ 0.010￿￿￿
’sk - 0.138￿￿￿ 0.121￿￿￿ 0.135￿￿￿ 0.121￿￿￿
’sh - 0.050￿￿￿ 0.028￿￿ 0.037￿￿￿ 0.028￿￿
’n+￿+￿ - ￿ 0.639￿￿￿ ￿ 0.553￿￿￿ ￿ 0.567￿￿￿ ￿ 0.553￿￿￿
’q(￿00) - - 0.225￿￿￿ - 0.225￿￿￿
’l - - - 0.037￿￿￿ ￿ 0.000
R2-Adjusted 0.24 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.53
Log-likelihood 737 790 801 794 801
Moran￿ s Idgeo 0.334￿￿￿ 0.284￿￿￿ 0.237￿￿￿ 0.258￿￿￿ 0.239￿￿￿
Moran￿ s Idgeo￿dinst 0.454￿￿￿ 0.422￿￿￿ 0.413￿￿￿ 0.403￿￿￿ 0.417￿￿￿
Notes: OLS estimates. Dependent variable: average growth rate of per worker
GDP. Column (1): absolute beta-convergence; Column (2): MRW conditional beta-
convergence; Column (3): MRW conditional beta-convergence plus institutional con-
trol; Column (4): MRW conditional beta-convergence plus geographical control; Col-
umn (5): MRW conditional beta-convergence plus both institutional and geographical
controls. ￿￿￿, ￿￿, and ￿ denote statistical signi￿cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respec-
tively.
TABLE 2: Likelihood ratio test of the spatial common factors (LRCom)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LRCom (dgeo) 3.3￿ 10.5￿￿ 12.5￿￿ 21.0￿￿￿ 23.6￿￿￿
LRCom (dgeo ￿ dinst) 23.2￿￿￿ 46.9￿￿￿ 32.8￿￿￿ 53.2￿￿￿ 47.5￿￿￿
Notes: dgeo: geographical distance weight; dgeo ￿ dinst: compounded geographical plus
institutional distance weight. Column (1): absolute beta-convergence; Column (2):
MRW conditional beta-convergence; Column (3): MRW conditional beta-convergence
plus institutional control; Column (4): MRW conditional beta-convergence plus geo-
graphical control; Column (5): MRW conditional beta-convergence plus both institu-
tional and geographical controls. ￿￿￿, ￿￿, and ￿ denote statistical signi￿cance at 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
24TABLE 3: Spatial Durbin growth regression model (SDM) based on
pure geographical distances (dgeo)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
￿ 0.027￿ ￿ 0.012 0.028 ￿ 0.023 ￿ 0.019
￿ ￿ 0.016￿￿￿ ￿ 0.011￿￿￿ ￿ 0.015￿￿￿ ￿ 0.010￿￿￿ ￿ 0.017￿￿￿
’sk - 0.126￿￿￿ 0.119￿￿￿ 0.126￿￿￿ 0.114￿￿￿
’sh - 0.067￿￿￿ 0.058￿￿￿ 0.068￿￿￿ 0.060￿￿￿
’n+￿+￿ - ￿ 0.535￿￿￿ ￿ 0.494￿￿￿ ￿ 0.542￿￿￿ ￿ 0.479￿￿￿
’q(￿00) - - 0.193￿￿￿ - 0.292￿￿￿
’l - - - ￿ 0.103￿￿ ￿ 0.172￿￿￿
￿ 0.715￿￿￿ 0.650￿￿￿ 0.611￿￿￿ 0.584￿￿￿ 0.579￿￿￿
￿ 0.014￿￿￿ 0.013￿￿￿ 0.013￿￿￿ 0.009￿￿￿ 0.016￿￿￿
#sk - ￿ 0.067￿￿ ￿ 0.070￿￿ ￿ 0.059￿ ￿ 0.048
#sh - ￿ 0.074￿￿￿ ￿ 0.083￿￿￿ ￿ 0.099￿￿￿ ￿ 0.096￿￿￿
#n+￿+￿ - 0.315￿ 0.328￿ 0.554￿￿￿ 0.481￿￿
#q - - ￿ 0.001 - ￿ 0.003￿￿
#l - - - 0.160￿￿￿ 0.233￿￿￿
(1 + ￿)￿ + ￿ ￿ 0.014 ￿ 0.005 ￿ 0.012 ￿ 0.006 ￿ 0.011
R2-Adjusted 0.24 0.48 0.52 0.53 0.55
Log-likelihood 871 916 921 921 928
AIC ￿ 1735 ￿ 1813 ￿ 1818 ￿ 1818 ￿ 1829
Notes: ML estimates. Dependent variable: average growth rate of per worker GDP. Col-
umn (1): absolute beta-convergence; Column (2): MRW conditional beta-convergence;
Column (3): MRW conditional beta-convergence plus institutional control; Column
(4): MRW conditional beta-convergence plus geographical control; Column (5): MRW
conditional beta-convergence plus both institutional and geographical controls. ￿￿￿, ￿￿,
and ￿ denote statistical signi￿cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
25TABLE 4: Spatial Durbin growth regression model (SDM) based on
compounded geographical and institutional distances (dgeo ￿ dinst)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
￿ 0.009 ￿ 0.019￿ 0.006 ￿ 0.026￿￿ ￿ 0.011
￿ ￿ 0.030￿￿￿ ￿ 0.027￿￿￿ ￿ 0.030￿￿￿ ￿ 0.026￿￿￿ ￿ 0.030￿￿￿
’sk - 0.088￿￿￿ 0.084￿￿￿ 0.091￿￿￿ 0.085￿￿￿
’sh - 0.102￿￿￿ 0.099￿￿￿ 0.102￿￿￿ 0.101￿￿￿
’n+￿+￿ - ￿ 0.251￿￿￿ ￿ 0.230￿￿￿ ￿ 0.269￿￿￿ ￿ 0.247
￿ 0.784￿￿￿ 0.760￿￿￿ 0.741￿￿￿ 0.744￿￿￿ 0.739￿￿￿
￿ 0.030￿￿￿ 0.030￿￿￿ 0.031￿￿￿ 0.029￿￿￿ 0.032￿￿￿
’q(￿00) - - 0.244￿￿ - 0.342￿￿￿
’l - - - ￿ 0.052 ￿ 0.095￿
#sk - ￿ 0.051￿￿ ￿ 0.053￿￿￿ ￿ 0.053￿￿￿ ￿ 0.052￿￿￿
#sh - ￿ 0.112￿￿￿ ￿ 0.122￿￿￿ ￿ 0.119￿￿￿ ￿ 0.124￿￿￿
#n+￿+￿ - 0.032 0.062 0.093 0.093
#q - - ￿ 0.002 - ￿ 0.003￿￿
#l - - - 0.075 0.116￿￿
(1 + ￿)￿ + ￿ ￿ 0.024 ￿ 0.017 ￿ 0.022 ￿ 0.017 ￿ 0.021
R2-Adjusted 0.26 0.49 0.54 0.54 0.56
Log-likelihood 932 992 996 993 998
AIC ￿ 1857 ￿ 1963 ￿ 1969 ￿ 1963 ￿ 1969
Notes: ML estimates. Dependent variable: average growth rate of per worker GDP. Col-
umn (1): absolute beta-convergence; Column (2): MRW conditional beta-convergence;
Column (3): MRW conditional beta-convergence plus institutional control; Column
(4): MRW conditional beta-convergence plus geographical control; Column (5): MRW
conditional beta-convergence plus both institutional and geographical controls. ￿￿￿, ￿￿,
and ￿ denote statistical signi￿cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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27FIGURE 3. AIC of the spatial growth regressions
Notes: Column (1): absolute beta-convergence; Column (2): MRW
conditional beta-convergence; Column (3): MRW conditional beta-
convergence plus institutional control; Column (4): MRW conditional
beta-convergence plus geographical control; Column (5): MRW con-
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